Maryland Law Review
Volume 76 | Issue 2

Article 8

Ave atque Vale
Peter E. Quint

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Legal Education Commons
Recommended Citation
76 Md. L. Rev. 522 (2017)

This Reflective Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Essay
AVE ATQUE VALE
PETER E. QUINT
I thought, since I have been here a long time, that it might be interesting,
particularly for newer members of the faculty, if I said a few words about the
way things were in the law school in an earlier period and also mentioned a
few of our colleagues of the past who contributed a particular tone to the
school. And I’ll say a bit about my own experiences as well.
When I arrived here in the autumn of 1972, this wonderful building
which we now inhabit did not exist and the law school had its quarters in a
considerably smaller structure roughly on the same spot. The Thurgood
Marshall Law Library did not exist either (the library was in the main body
of the building) and where our library is now, there was a large green lawn
particularly favored for touch football.
In the 1970s, the faculty seemed divided between the old guard—a
conservative group of what seemed to me like elderly gents—some people in
the middle, and a smaller group of young turks with lots of hair, of which I
was one, I suppose. In fact, students have told me that I was sometimes
known as “Rasputin” in those days.
But soon there was an influx of younger faculty members with a
distinctly 60’s left-liberal orientation, a number of whom are happily here
today. These refugees from the 60’s gave a sympathetic and rather laid-back
tone to the law school. It was this, I think, together with the fact that, in those
days, the emphasis seemed to be primarily on teaching, that contributed to
establishing a remarkably relaxed and friendly atmosphere within the faculty
that has lasted for many years—even after things changed (no doubt
properly) to the more earnest emphasis on scholarship that we have today.
Certainly, one of the great pleasures of the law school over the years has
been what I would call its—at least—moderate lefty-ness, which provides an
atmosphere in which one can actually breathe. I remember once visiting
© 2017 Peter E. Quint.
 Adapted from remarks delivered on May 5, 2015, at a reception on the occasion of Professor
Quint’s retirement.
 Jacob A. France Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law, University of Maryland Francis
King Carey School of Law.

522

2017]

AVE ATQUE VALE

523

Wayne State Law School where I had taught in the distant past. We were
chatting at mid-morning coffee when another faculty member came in (I
think he is now a very eminent teacher of antitrust) and he proposed a subject
for discussion that obviously meant a lot to him: he asked us each to suggest
our favorite candidate for the governmental agency that should be abolished
first. (Incidentally, he suggested abolition of the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the grounds that not much actual securities fraud was going
on. Even in the days before Bernie Madoff, this was breathtaking.)
In any event, my point is that we’ve never had to put up much with that
sort of thing here. Indeed, one of the most admirable traits of this great
faculty is its predominant focus on the public interest—work against
discrimination of all sorts, advocacy of environmental protection, work for
tax reform and against urban poverty. There are thousands of examples of
these projects, but I mention only Doug Colbert’s decades-long campaign for
legal representation of defendants at bail hearings, Karen Czapanskiy’s great
work on gender bias in the courts some years ago, and Rena Steinzor’s hair
raising—and completely convincing—jeremiads against the weakness of
environmental regulation today.
Another great aspect of life and work at the law school, which has been
most deeply gratifying for me, is our complete freedom to choose our own
path in research and scholarship. For example, in the forty-three years that I
have been here I don’t think we have ever hired anyone specifically to teach
comparative law—Hungdah Chiu may be a partial exception to this—but a
number of us have turned decisively in this direction by our own choice. I
would mention our retired colleague, Ted Tomlinson, a scholar in contracts
and administrative law, whose wonderful comparative work in French law
has always been a great inspiration to me1; and Marley Weiss, originally and
still a labor lawyer, who accomplished the almost unbelievable feat of
learning Hungarian as an adult to the point of being able to teach and write
in that language, and to do research in Hungarian law. And about midway
through my own work here, I shifted from writing about American
constitutional law to at least a pretty substantial admixture of work on
comparative constitutional law, particularly on the constitutional law of
Germany.
Moreover, for many years we have had a quite favorable faculty-student
ratio. This has not only permitted the extensive growth of clinics which are
very labor intensive, but also has meant that we have had, on the whole,
1. See, e.g., Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act of Things: A Study of
Judicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L. REV. 1299 (1988); Edward A. Tomlinson, Nonadversarial Justice:
The French Experience, 42 MD. L. REV. 131 (1983).
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considerable freedom in the choice and composition of courses. So we are
free to teach courses such as, for example (I select not entirely at random) the
Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany—a course that I
taught for a number of years (although I was never successful in making it a
required course—that’s a joke). This ability to choose and create seminars
has made it possible to reap the extraordinary benefits—for us and for our
students, as well—of having courses which arise out of the teacher’s deep
scholarly endeavors or other abiding interests. This excellence of the school
is reflected in the schedules of all of us, and so I just mention a couple, more
or less at random: Bill Reynolds’s much sought-after seminar in art law, and,
among our remarkable younger faculty members, Amanda Pustilnik’s
seminar in Neuroscience and the Law, and Michael Pappas’s seminar on
Food, Farming and Sustainability, and his seminar on Natural Resources,
which focuses on the legal implications of global warming and water
shortages.
And perhaps this is the moment for me to say—certainly not an original
thought by any means—that the younger members of the faculty who have
joined us in the last few years represent a truly extraordinary group of
teachers and scholars whose presence bodes very well for the future of this
institution.
When I first signed the agreement to come here, I remember Dean
Cunningham calling me on the telephone (I was still in New York, winding
up my affairs there) and he read me a long list of courses, saying, “We need
someone to teach these, why don’t you choose a couple?” If the Dean had
insisted, I probably would have taught Corporations—the subject of much of
my legal practice in New York—but on the list was Constitutional Law and,
of course, I couldn’t turn that down. And so that early phone call on a sunny
morning in New York was pretty fateful for me, although I probably didn’t
realize it at the time.
Another very happy chance occurred in 1976 when a group of German
academics from Heidelberg came to spend a day at the law school. I had
always maintained an interest in the German language since I had studied it
in college, and I had engaged in conversations about German law at Wayne
with my friend Fritz Juenger, a German academic then establishing himself
in the United States. As a result, I spent some time talking with those German
visitors in 1976. When I had a sabbatical looming a year or two later I wrote
to one of them to ask if he knew of a place where I could spend a sabbatical
year in Germany. Unbeknownst to me, he was an important figure at the Max
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in
Heidelberg—probably the very best place in Germany for an American to
dive into the waters of German constitutional law—and so this was a very
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happy accident that sent me again in a direction I found very gratifying and
fruitful. Sometime after my sabbatical in Heidelberg, I also spent a year in
Tübingen, a medieval university town of great charm, where I collaborated
with a German colleague in teaching a course on American constitutional law
to remarkably interested and talented German students; and I also spent a
fateful sabbatical year in Berlin about which I’ll say a word in a few
moments.
I have had a lot of fun, and very deep satisfaction, in writing, or in trying
to write, articles (and books) on the law—an endeavor on which we spend a
lot of our time, although sometimes outside observers of law faculties don’t
fully understand that.
Perhaps the most exciting of my projects started when, to everyone’s
surprise, the Berlin Wall was opened by some confused and bewildered East
German border guards on a cold November evening in 1989. Obviously the
social and political aspects of this event and what followed were of primary
importance, but there were also a lot of significant legal and particularly
constitutional problems involved as well. I was able to go to Berlin a month
and a half later, at the beginning of January 1990, and I spent two weeks there
doing interviews with political figures in East Germany across the political
spectrum—from the new parties of the citizens’ movement to the hard-line
Communist Party, which was then declining precipitately in power.2
Most exciting was the evening of January 8, 1990, when I observed, or
participated in, one of the huge Monday night protest marches which a few
weeks earlier had toppled the hard-line East German regime: a scene of
hundreds of thousands of people walking around the Ring in Leipzig, the
street that a century earlier had replaced the old city walls. At that point, no
one foresaw rapid German unification and everyone assumed that a
democratic East Germany would arise and exist for some years at least; and
so this was a great time of constitutional ferment, as people with democratic
political yearnings, now suddenly set free, began to work on proposals for a
new democratic East German constitution. In my interviews I tried to elicit
views from all sides about what a new constitution of East Germany should
look like. On the evening of January eighth, I was invited to attend one of
these drafting sessions in Leipzig for a citizens’ party called “New Forum.”
It was exhilarating to see a young man come in from the great demonstration,
place a banner with some democratic slogan against the wall, and then sit
2. For the results of these interviews, see Peter E. Quint, Building New Institutions in East
Germany, BALT. SUN, Jan. 21, 1990, at E1. See also PETER E. QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION:
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF GERMAN UNIFICATION (1997).
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down to help draft and debate the details of fundamental constitutional
provisions.
About two years later, shortly after German unification, I was fortunate
to be able to live in Berlin for a sabbatical year and to pursue these interviews,
now with people in East Germany who had participated in the events of
unification—and also in the drafting of democratic constitutions for the
newly created Eastern German states. It was great to be able to talk to these—
mainly young—people who had participated in these stirring events. The
most amazing of the interviews was a four-hour conversation with Lothar de
Maizière, who had been the first and only democratically elected Prime
Minister of East Germany. We talked a lot about the events of German
unification, but what was most impressive to me was that de Maizière, a
former professional viola player who had turned to law after a hand injury
ended his musical career, was clearly one of the very most brilliant and
cultivated people I had ever met—much to my surprise, in light of his rather
bumbling depiction in the press. Well I still have the tapes of this
conversation somewhere, but as time goes by, it may be more and more
difficult to find the antiquated equipment necessary to play them.
Some years later, in writing about civil disobedience in Germany, I also
did many interviews with members of the German peace movement of the
1980’s—and with the prosecutors who prosecuted them and the judges who
judged them.3 In the case of the German peace demonstrators, as with the
participants in German unification, these events seemed to be the high point
of their lives, and it was easy to evoke a flood of enlightening memories.
Teaching the classes here—particularly constitutional law in its various
forms—has also been a great joy and I have been joined in that exciting
endeavor by wonderfully talented colleagues. I would like to mention,
particularly, Dave Bogen, my predecessor as well as my colleague, whose
great articles on constitutional law helped to point the way in teaching that
deep and complex subject.4
And of course I have had many remarkable students—beginning with
Paige Marvel and her extraordinary class whom I had as students in the very
first year that I taught here. Another student in those early years was Elijah
Cummings—now my representative in Congress in my Baltimore City
district—who has been playing such a valiant role on the streets of the city in
the last few days. Other memorable students from the past are happily here
3. See PETER E. QUINT, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE GERMAN COURTS: THE PERSHING
MISSILE PROTESTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2008).
4. See, e.g., David S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 97 (1982); David S. Bogen, Balancing Freedom of Speech, 38 MD. L. REV. 387
(1979); David S. Bogen, Evans v. Abney: Reverting to Segregation, 30 MD. L. REV. 226 (1970).

2017]

AVE ATQUE VALE

527

today, including Bonnie and Mike Travieso, Sandy Cohen, Robin West, and
Markus Rauschecker.
I would like to say a word or two about another memorable student in
constitutional law—a student from many years ago who is now sadly
deceased. This was Alfred Mollin, who, at the time that he was taking the
evening program here, was also a full time professor (they call them “tutors”)
at St. John’s College in Annapolis. He was responsible—as were the rest of
the St. John’s tutors—for teaching everything, from DNA to calculus to
ancient Greek. Mollin’s brilliance was extraordinary, and when he
graduated, he gave me as a present a two volume textbook of ancient Greek
grammar that he and a colleague had written.5 That’s a present you don’t get
every day from your students. Mollin eventually left St. John’s and went on
to have a distinguished career as an appellate lawyer in the Justice
Department.
As I look back over more than forty years, there is a lot to think about
and a lot of people to recall. You come in as a young turk and you go out as
an old geezer and you meet a lot of people in between. So I’ll say a word or
two about a few colleagues who are no longer with us but who, in their
various ways, contributed to the history and atmosphere of this law school,
and contributed quite a lot to my own education as well. These are all people
who have been gone for quite a few years now and are probably not known
to most (or at least very many) of the faculty today.
I remember with particular warmth Everett Goldberg, a man of immense
talent and sharpness of mind. He was Associate Dean of the law school for
many years and during that period, according to Dean Kelly, his “integrity. . .
inherent decency [and] thoughtfulness” were “the soul of the [institution].”6
Rett, as he was called, had spent two years as a Peace Corps volunteer
teaching law in Ethiopia before coming to the law school. In the first year
that I was here I audited Rett’s great course in African law which was an
extraordinary combination of traditional law, colonial law, and the law of the
new—then, very new—independent African states. This magisterial course
was a high point in my education in comparative law. Rett never gave this
wonderful course again—I don’t know why; the enrollment was certainly
good. It was like a rare African flower that bloomed once but was to bloom
no more.
A considerably more problematic, but quite fascinating character, was
Max Isenbergh. Max had an extraordinary record at the Harvard Law School.
He was a law clerk of Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, and he seemed to
5. ALFRED MOLLIN & ROBERT WILLIAMSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANCIENT GREEK (1st
ed. 1980).
6. Michael J. Kelly, In Memoriam: Everett F. Goldberg, 53 MD. L. REV. 263, 263–64 (1994).
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know all the great legal and political figures of his generation and the
generation immediately preceding his, as well. (One day, for example, he
showed me correspondence to him from the former Secretary of State Dean
Acheson.) Although Max had clerked for Justice Black, he didn’t have much
to say about Black, but he had a lot to say about two other justices whom he
knew well, Justices Douglas and Frankfurter. His reflections on Douglas
were not complimentary, to say the least. With Frankfurter he had a close,
almost familial relationship, which is described in a wonderful piece by Max
in the Virginia Law Review some decades ago.7 Max taught constitutional
law, antitrust, and legal process. In constitutional law he had very strong,
clear ideas about what the Constitution meant and, in many instances, those
views were decidedly not the views of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Max was actually a torn spirit. He had great legal abilities, but he was
also a clarinetist who played at a professional level, and perhaps he never
quite decided which path he should follow. When Max retired, he agreed to
have a farewell ceremony like this one, but with the condition that there
should be no speeches. Rather he, and a quartet of string players from
Peabody Institute, would play the Mozart clarinet quintet. The ceremony
went off in a manner truly characteristic of Max. Two or three minutes into
the quintet, Max abruptly stopped the music. He didn’t like the way the
Peabody students were playing it. He gave them a few moments of no doubt
stern instruction about how the piece ought to be performed. They started
again and played the piece through beautifully.
Let me also briefly mention two more colleagues of the past. There was
a substantial period, I think, when John Brumbaugh was one of the central
figures of the law school faculty. (And his widow, Alice, is here today—this
was an intra-mural law school romance). John was always beautifully
dressed in a suit and tie, and he possessed a wonderful fluency of expression
and a quasi-British style and precision. John taught evidence, criminal law,
and jurisprudence, and his students found him a challenging and inspirational
teacher with a very subtle sense of humor and extraordinary devotion to the
University of Maryland School of Law.8 John was a traditionalist and
occasionally grumbled a bit about certain innovations in legal education, such
as the clinics. But it was a tribute to the tone of friendship and solidarity that
prevailed at the law school (and also a tribute to John’s good nature) that this
never descended into any kind of personal unfriendliness, as it had in so many
7. Max Isenbergh, Reminiscences of FF as a Friend, 51 VA. L. REV. 564 (1965).
8. See Howard S. Chasanow, Frederic N. Smalkin, Susan Leviton, Tanya Washington,
Edward S. Abrams, & Alan D. Hornstein, In Memoriam: John M. Brumbaugh, 61 MD. L. REV. 1
(2002).
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other institutions. John was universally liked and admired throughout the
faculty.
Well, I cannot speak of all of our departed colleagues, and so I have only
mentioned those from the rather distant past whom I knew the best. But I do
want to say a word about one of the youngest of them, Marc Feldman.
In the law, Marc was an adventurer or, as I said in a memorial piece
then, an explorer.9 His views contradicted much of what was generally
accepted in legal education at the time. Indeed, on the view that law school
itself, as things were then taught, ignored the social context of law and
downplayed the problems of the poor, Marc decided not to obtain a J.D.
degree at all, but rather to enter the bar by reading in a law office—a
nineteenth-century method that had survived in a few states only. After
joining the bar in this manner, Marc worked for the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission and directed a federal legal services office, providing legal
representation for the poor. Here at Maryland, Marc was one of the chief
theorists of the noted Legal Theory and Practice program, which sought to
expose students to the social meaning of legal problems. In his work, Marc
had become interested in the problems faced by public education, as an
instance of broader institutional failure, and he spent the last active year of
his life on sabbatical leave, observing public education and teaching at three
public schools in New York City—an unusual choice for a law school
sabbatical and another example of Marc’s audacious exploration. He planned
to write about these experiences in a work that would have been, perhaps,
part critique and part memoir. But sadly it was not to be. He suffered the
onset of his fatal illness as he was returning to Baltimore in the summer after
his sabbatical year in New York. Marc had a number of very close friends
on the faculty, among them Max Chibundu and also Richard Boldt—who
later wrote a major appreciation of Marc’s work in the Maryland Law
Review.10 As with the others I have mentioned, those who knew Marc still
mourn his loss.
I think the law school has been very fortunate in the deans who have
arrived since I have been here. As Greg Young has said, Mike Kelly, who
served an extraordinary tenure of sixteen years, should be considered—when
the history of the law school is written—really as the founder of the modern
University of Maryland School of Law. He was the originator or early
decisive supporter of many things that we take for granted now—one might
mention particularly the clinical program, the Health Law program and the
Environmental program. But it hardly ends there, and I would like to say a
9. Peter E. Quint, In Memoriam: Marc Feldman, 58 MD. L. REV. 325, 325–28 (1999).
10. Richard C. Boldt, Public Education as Public Space: Some Reflections on the Unfinished
Work of Marc Feldman, 61 MD. L. REV. 13 (2002).
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word about one other particularly notable aspect of Michael’s tenure. Mike
was (and remains) deeply interested in legal ethics from a philosophical point
of view, and for a substantial period under Mike’s aegis and thereafter there
was a strong and explicit philosophical emphasis at the law school. Not only
were we fortunate to have eminent philosophical writers such as David Luban
and, later, Robin West on the faculty itself—but a wonderful institution
called the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy at College Park (now
sadly dispersed, I am afraid) was very closely associated with the law school.
David was originally one of the philosophers from that center, as well as
Professor Judith Lichtenberg, David’s wife, and a number of other very
brilliant (and in some cases somewhat eccentric) individuals. They would
often come to the law school for philosophy reading groups, and they also
taught a number of elective courses here, such as the philosophy of
environmental protection, and the philosophy of the law of torts, a seminar
that I had the pleasure of auditing years ago. In the philosophy reading group
we read Rawls, Kant, Aristotle and others with some success; it was only
Hegel who defeated us. Incidentally, Greg Young mentioned the philosophy
reading groups as well, and I’m very happy to acknowledge the presence here
today of a great stalwart of those groups, Ken Abraham, now at Virginia.
Among deans after Mike Kelly, Don Gifford had the foresight and
acumen to plan this wonderful building in which we now reside, and
somehow—it still seems like a sort of miracle to me—to get it approved
through the layers of bureaucracy (ahead, I am told, of some supposedly prior
university projects). Karen Rothenberg shepherded the building to its
completion and, among many other accomplishments, greatly strengthened
our faculty through the recruitment of some of our extraordinary younger
faculty members—including some who are involved in the area of health law,
Karen’s first love and first focus of responsibility at the law school. Phoebe
Haddon was here for a shorter period, but she brought us the name of Francis
King Carey (and very substantial benefits therewith). And it was also under
Phoebe’s guidance that we were joined by the more recent of our brilliant
younger colleagues.
Donald Tobin, a native Marylander, has only recently arrived—but he
has been marshaling deliberation, skill and sensitivity in confronting the
current financial problems facing this institution as well as most other law
schools in the country.
So, looking back on this parade of individuals and parade of courses,
articles and other work over the years, we may ask for the major theme. As
I suggested before, I was and remain at least to some extent a refugee from
the 60’s, and back in those days it was common to hear law teachers say
something to the following effect: we are not teaching justice here, we are
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teaching law. Even the revered Oliver Wendell Holmes said things like that
sometimes.
But it seems to me that you can’t really teach law if you don’t think that
you are teaching justice or at least teaching people how to strive for justice,
and in your own work seeking justice. Justice may come in many forms; it
may not always be the precise result that you would choose in a particular
situation, for procedural regularity and the rule of law are certainly
components of justice and may sometimes require a result different from the
result that you might choose if you had your completely open and free choice.
But it seems to me that the whole lesson of the Socratic method—a method
in which I was taught at the Harvard Law School now more than fifty years
ago, and the method that I still think shows the finest traits of a legal
education—cannot be understood other than as a relentless quest for justice.
In the Socratic method, the relentless questioning of one argument over
another, one result over another, one explanation over another comes down
basically to the question of what is best for society and the individual and
whether society or the individual should be preferred in particular
circumstances when there is tension or dispute between them. In this sense,
justice is something outside of and beyond the law, against which the law
must be measured. And I believe that the process of learning and teaching
the law is the process of (articulately or inarticulately) seeking to develop an
understanding of justice and then seeking to refine the law so that it accords
more perfectly with that ideal.
Well, in any case, that’s my homily for today. I rarely get to deliver
homilies, and so I am happy to deliver this one. And because my time is
drawing to a close, I will end with a joke.
This is not a new joke—in fact it’s a very old joke.
I told this joke at a similar gathering when I left the law firm in New
York in 1972, and indeed a colleague Alan Hornstein told this joke at a
similar event here not so long ago. But it is a good joke and a pertinent joke
and so I’ll tell it again.
It seems that the playwright S. N. Behrman had spent some time writing
scripts in Hollywood but was about to return to New York, and so there was
a gala dinner in his honor before his departure, which lasted late into the
night.
The following morning, however, Behrman had to go into the office to
pick up some last papers, and there in the corridor he encountered the always
dangerous George S. Kaufman, the famous playwright. Kaufman fastened
upon him his gimlet eye and said to Behrman:
“Ah–hah! Forgotten but not gone!”
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Well, this is a pertinent story because I will be keeping my office,
staying in my office. (It may not always be too easy to find me in there, with
its furnishings of stacks of papers that give, you might say, a sympathetic
tone to the office—but I’ll be there basically.) I’ll be working on some old
projects and some new projects in constitutional law and in comparative law,
and—who knows?—perhaps I’ll have a chance to revisit Alfred Mollin’s
monumental two volumes.
In any case, I won’t be gone.
And I’ll try to make enough of the right kind of noise—or as one famous
writer put it, the right kind of legal music—so that I won’t be entirely
forgotten either.
Thank you.

